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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-05223) 
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Judges. 
                                              
 Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit 
Judge for the Third Circuit, assumed senior status on February 
1, 2017. 
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Michael J. Quirk, Esq. (Argued) 
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1515 Market Street, Suite 1300 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
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Kevin R. Bradford, Esq. 
Stephen R. Kovatis, Esq. 
Claudia M. Tesoro, Esq. (Argued) 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
21 South 12th Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
Counsel for Appellee 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
This case arises from the grievous death of State 
Trooper David Kedra, who was shot and killed by his 
instructor, then-Corporal Richard Schroeter, during a routine 
firearms training.  Although a long-term veteran of the police 
force and specifically certified in the safe use of firearms, 
                                              
** Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting 
by designation. 
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Schroeter allegedly disregarded each of the steps that he 
previously acknowledged in writing were required to safely 
perform a live demonstration of a firearm—skipping over both 
his own safety check and an independent check by a second 
person, treating the gun as if it were unloaded instead of 
loaded, pointing it at a person instead of a safe target, 
bypassing the required visual and physical inspection before a 
“trigger pull,” and then pulling the trigger with the gun aimed 
at Kedra’s chest.  JA 31.   
 
Appellant brought a civil rights complaint under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Schroeter’s conduct had 
subjected her deceased son to a state-created danger in 
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process rights.  But because the complaint did not allege that 
Schroeter had actual knowledge that there was a bullet in the 
gun when he fired it at Kedra, the District Court held that 
Schroeter was entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice.  Its reasoning was that the complaint 
pleaded only an objective theory of deliberate indifference, i.e., 
what a reasonable official should have known because the risk 
was so obvious, which was not then-clearly established, and 
was insufficient to plead the clearly established subjective 
theory of deliberate indifference, i.e., that Schroeter was 
actually aware that his conduct carried a substantial risk of 
serious harm.  We agree with the District Court that the 
objective theory of deliberate indifference was not clearly 
established at the time of the shooting.  However, because 
obviousness of risk is relevant to proving actual knowledge and 
the allegations of the complaint here are more than sufficient 
to support a reasonable inference that Schroeter had such 
knowledge, we conclude the complaint adequately pleads a 
state-created danger claim under a then-clearly established 
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theory of liability.  We therefore will reverse the District 
Court’s grant of qualified immunity and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. Background 
 
As this is an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, 
the factual allegations are taken from the complaint and are 
accepted as true.1  See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 
553 U.S. 639, 642 n.1 (2008).  David Kedra was a twenty-six-
year-old Pennsylvania State Trooper stationed in Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania.  In September 2014, Kedra was ordered 
to attend a routine firearm safety training, which included a 
demonstration of the features and operation of the new model 
of a State Police-issued handgun.  The training was led by then-
Corporal Schroeter, a trained firearms instructor who had been 
a police officer for about twenty years.   
 
Before the training, Schroeter acknowledged in writing 
a list of firearms safety rules for instructors, including that he 
must always perform a safety check of a gun before using it for 
training; that he must implement a second check on whether it 
is loaded by, e.g., having a second person check the gun; that 
he must treat all guns as if they are loaded; that he must never 
point the muzzle of a gun at another person; that he must keep 
his finger off the trigger, unless he opens the gun to verify it is 
unloaded before pointing it at a safe target and pulling the 
                                              
1 Appellant filed a First Amended Complaint that 
differed from her original complaint only in listing her title as 
“personal representative of the Estate.”  JA 29.  As the 
substance of the complaints is the same, we will simply refer 
to the relevant document as the “complaint.” 
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trigger; and that he must open the gun to visually and 
physically determine that it is unloaded before ever pulling the 
trigger.  At the training itself, however, Schroeter violated each 
of these rules when, in the course of explaining the “trigger 
reset” function on an operational handgun, he bypassed all of 
the safety checks, failed to physically or visually inspect the 
gun to ensure it was unloaded, raised the gun to chest level, 
pointed it directly at Kedra, and pulled the trigger.  JA 32.  The 
gun, in fact, was loaded, and it fired a bullet into Kedra’s 
abdomen at close range, causing Kedra’s death several hours 
later.   
 
Criminal charges were filed by state authorities, 
eventually resulting in Schroeter’s guilty plea in Pennsylvania 
state court to five counts of reckless endangerment of another 
person and his retirement from the State Police.  In addition, 
Kedra’s mother, as the representative of her son’s estate, filed 
a one-count civil complaint against Schroeter in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
claiming a violation of Kedra’s substantive due process rights 
to life and liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
making the above-referenced factual allegations, including as 
to Schroeter’s training and experience, his written 
acknowledgement of the risks and attendant safety protocols, 
and his guilty plea.  
 
Schroeter moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming he was entitled to 
qualified immunity because “[t]he gravamen of [p]laintiff’s 
[c]omplaint is that . . . Schroeter should have known that his 
firearm posed a substantial risk to those attending his class, not 
that . . . Schroeter actually did know that there was such a risk.”  
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
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Dismiss Complaint at 9–10, Kedra v. Schroeter, No. 15-5223 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2016), ECF No. 5-1.  That theory of liability, 
Schroeter argued, was not then-clearly established and, hence, 
he was entitled to qualified immunity.  Schroeter relied in 
particular on Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2006) (per curiam), in which we identified as an open question 
whether “deliberate indifference”—the mental state required 
for a state-created danger claim like this one—could be 
demonstrated using an objective test (i.e., merely by pointing 
to a substantial risk of serious harm that is so obvious that it 
should have been known), or whether, instead, a plaintiff must 
show the defendant had actual, subjective knowledge of the 
risk.   
 
The District Court accepted both Schroeter’s premise 
and conclusion, ruling, first, that Appellant’s complaint did not 
plead deliberate indifference based on actual knowledge 
because Appellant conceded she “could not and would not 
plead that [Schroeter] knew there was a bullet in the gun,” 
Kedra v. Schroeter, 161 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2016), 
and, second, that in view of Sanford, it was not clearly 
established that deliberate indifference could exist based only 
on the risk being “so obvious that it should be known,” id. at 
364–65 (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309).  The District Court 
acknowledged Appellant’s argument that, by alleging 
Schroeter had pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, 
Appellant had necessarily pleaded actual knowledge because 
the mens rea for this offense under Pennsylvania law is 
“conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily 
injury to another person.”  Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364 n.5 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Klein, 795 A.2d 424, 428 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002)).  However, the District Court deemed 
Schroeter’s guilty plea irrelevant on the ground that it would 
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not satisfy the criteria for non-mutual offensive collateral 
estoppel.2  Id.  Accordingly, the District Court viewed this case 
as “present[ing] the scenario anticipated but left unresolved by 
Sanford: a state actor proceeding despite a patently obvious 
risk that the actor should have recognized, but without actual 
knowledge that the risk existed,” and, thus, a theory of 
deliberate indifference that was not clearly established as 
required to defeat qualified immunity.  Id. at 364–66.  On that 
basis, the District Court dismissed the complaint with 
                                              
2 Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine that precludes 
relitigation of an issue already decided in a previous 
proceeding if “(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
was identical with the one presented in the later action, (2) 
there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against 
whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party 
to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom it is 
asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
in question in a prior action.”  Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 
542, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1996).  The District Court believed this 
last criterion was not satisfied because Schroeter did not 
“ha[ve] a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the question of 
his constitutional culpability on the basis of a guilty plea in a 
state criminal court.”  Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364 n.5.  
Although Appellant did not rely on the guilty plea for its 
preclusive effect, but only as a basis from which to infer 
Schroeter’s actual knowledge of the risk of harm, the District 
Court assumed that the requirements for collateral estoppel had 
to be satisfied for the plea to be considered in any way relevant.  
Id. 
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prejudice,3 Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 365–66, and this timely 
appeal followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over both a 
District Court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and its grant of qualified immunity.  
Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013); 
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2001).  In 
reviewing an order of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), we, like the District Court, must “accept 
as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 
inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to 
[the plaintiff].”  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
228, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government 
officials from civil liability for constitutional violations only if 
“their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent 
with the rights they are alleged to have violated.”  Anderson v. 
                                              
3 Appellant argues before us that the dismissal should 
have been without prejudice so that she could have an 
opportunity to supplement her pleading of deliberate 
indifference in an amended complaint.  Because we conclude 
Appellant already pleaded sufficient facts to sustain her claim, 
see infra Section III.B.1, we need not address whether the 
District Court erred in denying leave to amend. 
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Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).  In considering whether 
qualified immunity attaches, courts perform a two-pronged 
analysis to determine: (1) “whether the facts that [the] plaintiff 
has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right,” 
and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at 
the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.”  Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  Here, the District Court 
disposed of the complaint at the second prong by concluding 
that because Appellant had not alleged Schroeter’s actual 
knowledge of a bullet in the chamber, her theory of deliberate 
indifference was based solely on the objective test we had 
identified in Sanford as unresolved, so that “the violative 
nature of Defendant’s alleged conduct ha[d] not been clearly 
established.”  Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364–66.   
 
As a preliminary matter that will inform the scope of our 
review, we note that by taking this approach, the District Court 
addressed the “clearly established” inquiry only in part.  For 
the question posed by the District Court—whether it was then-
clearly established that obviousness of risk untethered from 
actual knowledge could prove deliberate indifference—goes to 
whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the elements of a 
state-created danger claim, as then defined.  See Phillips, 515 
F.3d at 235, 240–42.  In contrast, the clearly established 
inquiry at the second prong, as we have described it, goes not 
to whether a plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a constitutional 
violation (the question answered at the first prong), but to 
whether the right allegedly violated—defined in terms of the 
“particularized” factual context of that case, Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 639–40—was a “clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right[] of which a reasonable [officer] would 
have known,” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 
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n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)).4   
 
Granted, the contours of a given right are necessarily 
co-extensive with the scope of conduct that violates that right, 
so that where it would not be clear to “a reasonable official . . 
. that what he is doing violates [a] right,” Anderson, 483 U.S. 
                                              
4 In ruling that an objective test was not a clearly 
established means to plead deliberate indifference, the District 
Court’s approach arguably combined elements of both the first 
and second prongs of the qualified immunity analysis.  Yet, 
those inquiries diverge in a significant respect with regard to 
mens rea, for even where an element of a claimed violation 
includes a subjective test, “the test for qualified immunity is 
objective . . . .  That is, [an official] is entitled to qualified 
immunity only if she can show that a reasonable person in her 
position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of 
clearly established law, that her conduct comported with 
established legal standards.”  Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 142 
n.15.  And for that reason, we have instructed courts to treat 
the two prongs of qualified immunity as analytically distinct so 
as to avoid confusing their different mens rea requirements.  
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 242.  At the same time, as the Supreme 
Court has recognized, “whether a particular complaint 
sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law 
cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded,” and 
“[i]n that sense the sufficiency of [Appellant’s] pleadings is 
both inextricably intertwined with, and directly implicated by, 
the qualified immunity defense.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 673 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks 
citations omitted); accord L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 
235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 11 
at 640, the second prong of qualified immunity would not be 
satisfied regardless of whether the lack of clarity arose from an 
uncertain theory of liability or from the application of a clearly 
established theory of liability to a set of facts so novel as to 
deprive an actor of fair notice of the violative nature of his 
actions.  But where a defendant contends that neither the theory 
of liability nor the right at issue is clearly established, the 
reviewing court may need to analyze both to determine 
conclusively whether the defendant is entitled to qualified 
immunity.  See, e.g., Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 142 n.15 
(observing, on the one hand, that the constitutional right as 
defined by the factual context of that case was clearly 
established and, on the other hand, that the “doctrine of 
deliberate indifference was also clearly established at the 
relevant time”).   
 
Here, the District Court addressed the “clearly 
established” inquiry only in the first sense, determining that the 
theory of liability was not clearly established.  Because we 
conclude this was error, we also address the inquiry in the 
second sense, assessing whether, under the facts of this case, 
the specific right at issue was clearly established.5  Thus, first 
we will undertake a review of relevant substantive due process 
principles.  See infra Section III.A.  Second, we will examine 
                                              
5 We undertake this inquiry in the first instance to decide 
whether we may affirm on this alternative ground, see MRL 
Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 
2016), and because it turns on a purely legal question, our 
resolution of which will best serve the interests of judicial 
efficiency on remand, see Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 837 F.3d 
356, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2016); Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 
186, 189 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 12 
whether the complaint sufficiently pleads a violation of 
Kedra’s substantive due process rights under a theory of 
deliberate indifference that was clearly established.  See infra 
Section III.B.  And third, we will consider whether the 
particular right at issue was clearly established at the relevant 
time, see infra Section III.C, i.e., “whether the law, as it existed 
[at the time of the shooting], gave [Schroeter] ‘fair warning’ 
that [his] actions were unconstitutional” in the particular 
factual scenario he confronted.  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 
430 F.3d 140, 154 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
A. Applicable Legal Principles 
 
In asserting her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a 
deprivation of Kedra’s rights to life and liberty, Appellant 
invokes the Due Process Clause, which at its core protects 
individuals against arbitrary government action.  See Cty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).  While 
“the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative 
obligation on the state to protect its citizens,” there is an 
exception to this general rule that nevertheless holds an officer 
liable if his conduct exposes an individual to a “state-created 
danger.”6  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235.  Such a claim requires 
                                              
6 We are unconvinced by Schroeter’s argument that no 
state-created danger claim is cognizable where, as here, the 
alleged violation is based on a state actor’s endangerment of a 
fellow government employee.  While the Due Process Clause 
does not guarantee state employees “certain minimal levels of 
safety and security” in the workplace, Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992), we have long held that a 
government employee may bring a substantive due process 
claim against his employer if the state compelled the employee 
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proof of four elements: (1) the harm caused was foreseeable 
and fairly direct; (2) the state official “acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience”; (3) the state and the 
plaintiff had a relationship such that “the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts”; and (4) the official 
affirmatively used his authority “in a way that created a danger 
to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to 
danger” than had he never acted.  Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 
443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
Here, the District Court focused, as do the parties on 
appeal, on the second element of a state-created danger claim.7  
                                              
to be exposed to a risk of harm not inherent in the workplace, 
see Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 430–31 (3d Cir. 
2006); Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 212–
13 (3d Cir. 2001).  We have no trouble concluding this standard 
is met in the context of a mandatory firearms training in which 
the trainees were required to be physically present without 
protection and the firearms instructor, instead of following 
safety protocols and demonstrating the proper use of a firearm, 
disregarded all protocols and fired directly at a trainee at close 
range. 
7 Schroeter also appears to contest the fourth element by 
casting his conduct as an omission to check the gun for a bullet 
and contending that he may be held liable only for an 
affirmative act.  Yet the complaint alleges Schroeter skipped 
over required safety checks, picked up a firearm, raised it, 
pointed it at Kedra, and pulled the trigger. These indisputably 
affirmative acts “created an opportunity for harm that would 
not have otherwise existed.”  Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 
181, 197 (3d Cir. 2004).  Those acts, which directly caused 
Kedra’s death, also set this case apart from those that we have 
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See Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363.  That is, because “[l]iability 
for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the 
threshold of constitutional due process,” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 
849, government action rises to the level of an actionable 
constitutional violation only when it is “so egregious, so 
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary 
conscience,” id. at 847 n.8.  The exact level of culpability 
required to shock the conscience, however, depends on the 
circumstances of each case, and the threshold for liability 
varies with the state actor’s opportunity to deliberate before 
taking action.  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 240–41; see also Lewis, 
523 U.S. at 848–54.   
 
We have identified three potential levels of culpability.  
In “hyperpressurized environment[s] requiring a snap 
judgment,” an official must actually intend to cause harm in 
order to be liable.  Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 
962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
situations in which the state actor is required to act “in a matter 
of hours or minutes,” we require that the state actor “disregard 
a great risk of serious harm.”  Sanford, 456 F.3d at 310.  And 
where the actor has time to make an “unhurried judgment[],” a 
plaintiff need only allege facts supporting an inference that the 
official acted with a mental state of “deliberate indifference.”  
Id. at 309. 
 
                                              
deemed to involve mere omissions.  See, e.g., Bright, 443 F.3d 
at 284–85 (state actor not liable for failing to prevent harm 
inflicted by a third party); D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374–76 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (same).   
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As the District Court correctly recognized, see Kedra, 
161 F. Supp. 3d at 363, because Appellant here alleged that 
Schroeter had the opportunity to exercise “unhurried 
judgment[],” she was required to plead facts in her complaint 
supporting the inference that Schroeter acted with “deliberate 
indifference,” which we have described variously as a 
“conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm,” 
Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted), or “willful disregard” demonstrated by actions 
that “evince a willingness to ignore a foreseeable danger or 
risk,” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 910 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  While categorically different from “intent to cause 
harm,” which is the threshold mental state reserved for officials 
in “hyperpressurized” situations where “snap judgment[s]” 
may be required, Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973, deliberate 
indifference “has an elusive quality to it,” Sanford, 456 F.3d at 
301, “fall[ing] somewhere between intent, which ‘includes 
proceeding with knowledge that the harm is substantially 
certain to occur’ and negligence, which involves ‘the mere 
unreasonable risk of harm to another,’” Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 
n.10. 
 
Here the District Court examined one of the elusive 
aspects of deliberate indifference with which we and other 
Courts of Appeals have wrestled over time: whether deliberate 
indifference in the substantive due process context—as 
opposed to the Eighth Amendment context—may be satisfied 
using an objective test or only a subjective “actual knowledge” 
test.  See Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364–65 (citing Sanford, 
456 F.3d at 309 & n.13).  In the Eighth Amendment context, 
the Supreme Court has rejected an objective standard for 
“deliberate indifference,” i.e., a standard where liability may 
be premised on an official’s objective “failure to alleviate a 
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significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,” 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994), and the Court 
has instead explicitly required a showing of “subjective 
culpability,” id. at 843 n.8, i.e., a showing that “the official 
kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk,” id. at 837.  But 
uncertainty about whether this “subjective culpability” 
requirement carried over to pretrial detainees and other 
plaintiffs asserting substantive due process claims produced a 
split among the Courts of Appeals.8  That split led us in Sanford 
to note, in the substantive due process context, “the possibility 
that deliberate indifference might exist without actual 
knowledge of a risk of harm when the risk is so obvious that it 
should be known,” 456 F.3d at 309, and to acknowledge 
shortly thereafter that we “ha[d] not yet definitively answered 
the question of whether the appropriate standard in a non-
Eighth Amendment substantive due process case is subjective 
                                              
8 Compare, e.g., Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 
(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the test for deliberate indifference 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is “closer to tort 
recklessness” than to the Eighth Amendment’s “criminally 
reckless” standard), Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 
183 F.3d 902, 905–06 (8th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that the 
purely subjective standard from Farmer may be inappropriate 
for due process claims brought by pretrial detainees), and 
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 
2003) (framing the standard in the state-created danger context 
as whether the risk was “obvious or known”), with, e.g., 
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(adopting Farmer’s subjective standard for due process 
claims), and Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (same).  
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or objective,” Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 430–31 
(3d Cir. 2006).   
 
More recently, both the Supreme Court and this Court 
have spoken to the issue.  In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. 
Ct. 2466 (2015), distinguishing between the different language 
of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and the 
different nature of those claims, the Supreme Court held that a 
pretrial detainee claiming a substantive due process violation 
based on excessive force “must show . . . only that the officers’ 
use of that force was objectively unreasonable” and not “that 
the officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 2470, 2475.  While the Court 
acknowledged that “the defendant must possess a purposeful, 
a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind” because 
“liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath 
the threshold of constitutional due process,” it clarified that this 
subjective requirement pertained only to “the defendant’s state 
of mind with respect to his physical acts”—in other words, his 
actions themselves needed to be deliberate and not 
“accidental[]” or “negligent[]”—but did not pertain to whether 
the actions the defendant deliberately took were 
“unreasonable” or “excessive in relation to [a legitimate] 
purpose.”  Id. at 2472–73 (emphasis omitted).  Rejecting the 
arguments that an objective test would devolve into a 
negligence standard, id. at 2474, was not “workable,” id., or 
would lead to a “flood of claims,” id. at 2476, the Court held 
that “the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the proper 
interpretation” of his physical acts should be assessed by an 
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“objective standard,” depending on “the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene.”9  Id. at 2472–73.   
 
Consistent with this approach, we too recently 
embraced an objective standard in the context of a substantive 
due process claim—in particular, for a claim of state-created 
danger.  In L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, we denied 
qualified immunity to a teacher who released a kindergartener 
                                              
9 Recognizing the significance of Kingsley, the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, has extended it to failure-to-protect 
claims, framing the test as whether a “reasonable officer in the 
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 
involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s 
conduct obvious,” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 
1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and the Second Circuit 
has extended it to conditions-of-confinement claims, holding 
that “deliberate indifference should be defined objectively for 
a claim of a due process violation” and that the relevant inquiry 
post-Kingsley is what the “defendant-official knew, or should 
have known,” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35–36 (2d Cir. 
2017).  Cf. Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 
F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Kingsley 
to failure-to-protect claims absent en banc reconsideration of 
controlling Circuit precedent).  Like the Supreme Court, both 
Circuits explicitly rejected arguments that an objective test 
would devolve into a negligence standard.  See Darnell, 849 
F.3d at 36 (“[A]ny § 1983 claim for a violation of due process 
requires proof of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.”); 
Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 n.4 (observing that an objective test 
“prevent[s] ‘overinclusiveness’ by ensuring that liability will 
attach only in cases where the defendant’s conduct is more 
egregious than mere negligence”).  
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to a stranger who then abused the child.  836 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 
2016).  After reiterating our observation in Sanford that 
“deliberate indifference might exist without actual knowledge 
of a risk of harm when the risk is so obvious that it should be 
known,” id. at 246, we held this standard was met by the 
allegations in that complaint.  Specifically, we held the risk of 
harm from the teacher’s conduct was “‘so obvious’ as to rise 
to the level of deliberate indifference,” id., and that L.R. had 
sufficiently pleaded as “a matter of common sense” that the 
teacher “knew, or should have known, about the risk of his 
actions,” id. at 245 (emphasis added).  Although we indicated 
that the plaintiff’s allegations also satisfied the subjective 
standard, id. at 246 (“What is more, . . . the fact that [the 
teacher] asked [the stranger] for her identification illustrates 
that [the teacher] himself was indeed aware of the risk of 
harm[.]”), we concluded that “[e]xposing a young child to an 
obvious danger is the quintessential example of when qualified 
immunity should not shield a public official from suit,” id. at 
250.10   
                                              
10 In his concurrence, Judge Fisher seeks to revisit L.R., 
positing, despite its terms, that it left Sanford’s question 
unanswered; that its reliance on the objective test was dictum 
because it also observed the teacher’s conduct would meet the 
subjective test, but see Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 
535, 537 (1949) (discussing the significance of alternative 
holdings); Meister v. Comm’r, 504 F.2d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 
1974) (noting that where we give “an alternative basis for our 
holding” prefaced with language such as “additionally,” this 
does not mean the earlier holding is to be “disregarded” or is 
any less “critical”); and that an objective test cannot distinguish 
between conscience-shocking behavior and mere negligence 
and thus risks rendering the Fourteenth Amendment a “font of 
 20 
Seeking to benefit from the trajectory of this case law,11 
Appellant would have us rely on L.R. to conclude an objective 
                                              
tort law,” Concurrence at 6; but see Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 
2474; Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 231; Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35–36; 
Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.  While our concurring colleague may 
disagree with the evolution of our substantive due process 
jurisprudence, we generally may not, short of en banc 
reconsideration, alter our Circuit precedent, see Bimbo 
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 
2010), and we have no occasion to do so today.  Instead, our 
concern is whether Appellant sufficiently pleaded deliberate 
indifference under a culpability standard that was then-clearly 
established.  For the reasons we explain below, see infra 
Section III.B.1, Appellant’s allegations as to Schroeter’s 
training and experience, to say nothing of his written 
acknowledgements and admissions in the context of his guilty 
plea, are more than sufficient to show deliberate indifference 
under the then-clearly established subjective standard and 
conduct that was not merely negligent but “shocks the 
conscience,” Bright, 443 F.3d at 281. 
11 We also recently resolved what we had identified as 
an open question after Farmer, see Woloszyn v. Cty. of 
Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005), as to whether the 
“deliberate indifference” standard in the prison suicide context 
is a subjective or objective one.  Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 
209 (3d Cir. 2017).  There too we held the standard was 
objective and identified the relevant inquiry for both 
substantive due process claims and Eighth Amendment claims 
as whether “the prison official knew or should have known of 
the individual’s particular vulnerability,” id. at 224 (emphasis 
added), explaining that “[i]t is not necessary for the custodian 
to have a subjective appreciation of the detainee’s particular 
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standard of deliberate indifference was clearly established at 
the time Schroeter shot Kedra and to reverse the District Court 
on that basis.  We reject that invitation, however, because we 
assess qualified immunity based on the law that was “clearly 
established at the time an action occurred,” Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818, while L.R. was not decided until nearly two years after 
the action at issue in this case.  That is, regardless of what may 
be deemed “clearly established” in the wake of Kingsley and 
L.R., we must look to the state of the law at the time of 
shooting.  And at that point, as the District Court correctly 
recognized, it was not yet clearly established whether 
deliberate indifference in the substantive due process context 
was governed by an objective or subjective standard.  See 
Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364–65 (citing Sanford, 456 F.3d at 
309 & n.13).  The question to which we therefore turn is 
whether Appellant pleaded deliberate indifference under the 
subjective test, which was then-clearly established, or under an 
objective test, which then was not.   
 
B. Whether Appellant Pleaded Her Claim Under A 
Clearly Established Theory of Deliberate 
Indifference 
Given the historical ambiguity in our case law, we agree 
with the District Court that Schroeter’s arguments might have 
traction if Appellant had pleaded deliberate indifference based 
merely on what Schroeter should have known in view of the 
obviousness of a particular risk.  But there’s the rub: That is 
                                              
vulnerability.  Rather, . . . ‘reckless or deliberate indifference 
to that risk’ only demands ‘something more culpable on the 
part of the officials than a negligent failure to recognize the 
high risk of suicide,’” id. at 231 (citation omitted). 
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not what Appellant pleaded.  Contrary to the way that 
Schroeter and the District Court characterize it, the complaint 
here clearly and unmistakably alleges facts that support an 
inference of actual, subjective knowledge of a substantial risk 
of lethal harm, and neither the Supreme Court nor we have 
wavered from the well-established principle that a plaintiff may 
plead and prove deliberate indifference in the substantive due 
process context using this subjective test. 
 
In the discussion to follow, we first address whether the 
complaint pleads deliberate indifference under the clearly 
established subjective test and then turn to the District Court’s 
misunderstanding of that test in requiring Appellant to plead 
knowledge of the certainty of harm instead of knowledge of the 
substantial risk of harm. 
 
1. Application of the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard 
 
At the pleading stage, courts must “accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233.  Although 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007), we demand “only enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and “do not require 
heightened fact pleading of specifics,” id. at 570.  Determining 
whether the facts pleaded have “nudged” the claim “across the 
line from conceivable to plausible” is “a context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
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experience and common sense.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 679–80 (2009). 
 
To make this assessment on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
“courts must consider the complaint in its entirety,” Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), 
and “determine whether the complaint as a whole contains 
sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim,” 
Argueta v. U.S. Immig. & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  “The inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have 
recognized, is whether all of the facts alleged, taken 
collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not 
whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, 
meets that standard.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23.   
 
Here, then, the relevant question is whether the 
complaint, considering all the allegations, pleads sufficient 
facts to support the inference that when Schroeter pointed his 
gun at Kedra at close range and deliberately pulled the trigger 
without even once checking whether the gun was loaded, he 
acted with subjective deliberate indifference, i.e., actual 
awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm, lying 
“somewhere between intent . . . and negligence.”  Morse, 132 
F.3d at 910 n.10.  A plaintiff can plead deliberate indifference 
by reference to circumstantial and direct evidence.  See 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.  Three broad categories of 
circumstantial evidence are alleged in the complaint, and we 
have deemed each probative of deliberate indifference in the 
past: (1) evidence that the risk was obvious or a matter of 
common sense, (2) evidence that the actor had particular 
professional training or expertise, and (3) evidence that the 
actor was expressly advised of the risk of harm and the 
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procedures designed to prevent that harm and proceeded to 
violate those procedures. 
 
First, the complaint points to the obvious risk of harm 
in pointing the muzzle of a gun at another person and pulling 
the trigger, while skipping any kind of safety check.  Perhaps 
because it concluded that Appellant pleaded deliberate 
indifference by relying on only the objective obviousness of 
risk, the District Court did not acknowledge or discuss the 
relevance of obviousness of risk to proving actual knowledge 
of risk.  See Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 362–66.  But the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that, even under a 
subjective test, “the fact that the risk of harm is obvious” is 
relevant, among other pieces of evidence, to “infer the 
existence of this subjective state of mind.”  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730, 738 (2002).  We, too, have observed that “subjective 
knowledge on the part of the official can be proved by 
circumstantial evidence to the effect that the excessive risk was 
so obvious that the official must have known of the risk.”12  
Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 133.   
 
                                              
12 Our Sister Circuits, with near unanimity, also have 
recognized the relevance of obviousness of risk to proving 
actual knowledge.  See, e.g., Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-
Davila, 813 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2016); Gant ex rel. Gant v. 
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 141 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999); 
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 
2006); Farnham, 394 F.3d at 478; Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 
419, 425 (8th Cir. 2017); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 
F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006); Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 
F.3d 1108, 1116 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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For that reason, we have regularly relied on the 
obviousness of risk as a permissible and highly relevant basis 
from which to infer actual knowledge—even directing in our 
Model Civil Jury Instructions that, in assessing deliberate 
indifference for state-created danger claims, a jury is “entitled 
to infer from the obviousness of the risk that [the state actor] 
knew of the risk.”  Third Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions 
§ 4.14 (Mar. 2017).  In Kneipp v. Tedder, for example, police 
officers sent a woman home “unescorted in a visibly 
intoxicated state in cold weather,” and we reversed a grant of 
summary judgment in their favor, citing the foreseeable and 
obvious risk that the woman would later fall down an 
embankment and suffer hypothermia.  95 F.3d 1199, 1201–03, 
1208–09, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996).  In Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 911 dispatchers gave confidential information to a 
distressed and suspended co-worker concerning the 
whereabouts of his ex-girlfriend, and we likewise reversed the 
dismissal of a complaint against the dispatchers because they 
were “aware that [the co-worker] was distraught over his break 
up” and they could reasonably foresee that some type of serious 
harm could result from giving him the information; hence, the 
inferences to be drawn from “ordinary common sense” 
supported the dispatchers’ knowledge of risk.  515 F.3d at 228–
29, 241, 246.  So too here: The risk of lethal harm when a 
firearms instructor skips over each of several safety checks 
designed to ascertain if the gun is unloaded, points the gun at a 
trainee’s chest, and pulls the trigger is glaringly obvious, and 
this obviousness supports the inference that the instructor had 
actual knowledge of the risk of serious harm.   
 
Second, the complaint alleges that Schroeter was a 
specially trained firearms instructor with twenty years of 
experience.  And that training and experience is no less 
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relevant to Schroeter’s actual knowledge of the substantial risk 
of harm here than the “medical training” of which we took note 
for the emergency medical technicians in Rivas v. City of 
Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 185, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2004), or the 
“experience as a teacher in charge of a kindergarten classroom” 
that we deemed relevant to the teacher’s knowledge of risk in 
releasing the child to a stranger in L.R., 836 F.3d at 245;13 see 
also MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 217 
(3d Cir. 2005) (observing that, even where a risk is “so 
obvious,” an individual’s prior “experience and knowledge” 
makes it more likely that he will “realize[]” that risk).  Thus, 
even if, hypothetically, the obviousness of the risk here would 
not be sufficient to impute actual knowledge to a layperson, the 
combination of obviousness with Schroeter’s specialized 
training and expertise in firearms safety is easily sufficient to 
give rise to an inference of actual knowledge of risk. 
 
Third, the complaint alleges that Schroeter was 
expressly advised of the lethal risk in handling any operational 
firearm through the safety rules that he acknowledged in 
writing and that, as a training instructor, he himself was 
responsible for teaching to others.  Those safety protocols were 
                                              
13 Schroeter argues that we should disregard L.R. 
entirely because it post-dated the shooting.  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, however, a later-decided case may still be 
considered when assessing whether a principle was clearly 
established to the extent the case is merely “illustrative of the 
proper application” of a previously established constitutional 
principle.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) 
(discussing this meaning of “clearly established” in the habeas 
context).  It is for that limited purpose that we refer to L.R. in 
this part of our discussion.  
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clear and detailed, requiring that an instructor, prior to 
demonstrating the use of a firearm, (a) conduct a safety check 
to ensure the gun was not loaded, (b) implement a second 
safety check by, e.g., having a second person independently 
verify the gun is not loaded, (c) always treat the firearm as if it 
were loaded, (c) point the muzzle only at a safe target, (d) never 
point the firearm at another person, (e) always keep his finger 
off the trigger unless firing at a safe target, and (f) before 
demonstrating a “trigger pull,” open the gun to visually and 
physically confirm it is unloaded.  JA 31.  The complaint 
alleges that Schroeter not only ignored these directives but 
directly contravened each and every one of them.  Those 
allegations—which could be characterized as not merely 
circumstantial, but even direct, evidence of mens rea—give 
rise to at least as strong an inference of knowledge of risk as 
the kindergarten teacher’s knowledge and disregard of school 
policy concerning the release of children in L.R., 836 F.3d at 
240 & n.2, 245, and the 911 dispatchers’ “unauthorized” 
disclosure of what they knew constituted “confidential 
information” in Phillips, 515 F.3d at 229, 241.   
 
In addition to these three categories of evidence that 
support an inference of actual knowledge, the complaint also 
alleges direct evidence of Schroeter’s mental state in the form 
of his criminal plea to reckless endangerment.  That guilty plea 
required Schroeter, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, to admit 
that he “recklessly engage[d] in conduct which place[d] . . . 
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury,” 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705, with the mental state of “conscious[] 
disregard[] [of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of serious 
harm, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b)(3); see also Klein, 795 A.2d 
at 427–28.  In other words, even assuming Appellant could not 
invoke “non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel” to seek a 
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judgment based in part on issue preclusion—which was the 
ground on which the District Court disregarded the plea,14 
Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 364 n.5—the allegation in the 
complaint that Schroeter pleaded guilty to these charges 
reflects a statement by a party-opponent, presumptively 
admissible at trial, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), that Schroeter 
acted with the requisite knowledge of risk. 
 
In sum, this is not a case where Appellant’s theory of 
deliberate indifference devolves to mere negligence or is based 
only on what Schroeter objectively should have known given 
the obvious risk.  Instead, the obviousness of the risk in 
pointing a gun at a defenseless person and pulling the trigger 
                                              
14 The question whether a state criminal conviction 
based on a guilty plea may be preclusive of any claims or issues 
is a question of the law of the state where the criminal 
proceeding took place, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 
104–05 (1980); Dici, 91 F.3d at 547–48, and one we need not 
answer as Appellant relies on the plea at this stage not to invoke 
issue preclusion, but only to argue that her allegations were 
sufficient to survive Schroeter’s motion to dismiss.  We note, 
however, that under Pennsylvania law, a party’s “criminal 
conviction may be used to establish the operative facts in a 
subsequent civil case based on those same facts, and . . . [a] 
guilty plea constitutes an admission to all the facts averred in 
the indictment.”  Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. Mitchell, 
535 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1987) (citation omitted); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 
1982).  Particularly where, as here, a party is not claiming issue 
preclusion but is relying on a plea only as a factual allegation 
to support an inference of actual knowledge, the plea is, at least 
to that extent, relevant. 
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without undertaking any safety check whatsoever only 
reinforces the many other allegations of the complaint 
reflecting Schroeter’s “conscious disregard of a substantial risk 
of serious harm.”  Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973 (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “[D]raw[ing] all inferences 
from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to 
[Appellant],” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, the allegations in 
Appellant’s complaint are more than sufficient to state a claim 
for a state-created danger based on actual knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm—the subjective theory of 
deliberate indifference that was then-clearly established.  See 
Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309–10 & n.13. 
 
2. The District Court’s Misapprehension of 
the Culpability Required for Deliberate 
Indifference 
 
The District Court reached the opposite conclusion, 
relying on the premise that Schroeter’s conduct could not 
reflect a “conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious 
harm,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted), unless Schroeter actually knew there 
was a bullet in the chamber, see Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363–
66.  That approach, however, fundamentally misapprehends 
(1) the relevance of circumstantial evidence to inferring actual 
knowledge, (2) the pleading standard applicable at this stage of 
the case, (3) the culpability required for cases involving 
“unhurried judgment[],” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973, and (4) the 
essential purposes of the state-created danger doctrine.  
 
First, by requiring Appellant to plead Schroeter’s 
knowledge of a bullet in the chamber, the District Court in 
effect required plaintiffs to plead actual knowledge using only 
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direct evidence.  But the Supreme Court has instructed that 
“[w]hether a [state actor] ha[s] the requisite knowledge of a 
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in 
the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial 
evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official 
knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was 
obvious,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted); see also 
Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, and we have likewise stated that 
“[i]nferring mental state from circumstantial evidence is 
among the chief tasks of factfinders,” United States v. Wright, 
665 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 2012); see also McFadden v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 n.1 (2015) (“The Courts of 
Appeals have held that, as with most mens rea requirements, 
the Government can prove the requisite mental state through 
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.”).   
 
Second, in concluding that the allegations of the 
complaint (other than Schroeter’s criminal guilty plea) do not 
give rise to an inference of actual knowledge of risk, the 
District Court and our concurring colleague have done the 
inverse of what we are required to do at the pleading stage: 
Instead of considering the complaint as a whole, they consider 
“whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, 
meets that standard,” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23, and instead 
of “draw[ing] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light 
most favorable to [the plaintiff],” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, 
they draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the 
defendant.  For example, while acknowledging that 
obviousness of risk can support an inference of actual 
knowledge, the Concurrence posits that obviousness of risk 
“could also . . . support an inference that there was not 
deliberate indifference.”  Concurrence at 9.  While not 
disputing that Schroeter’s training and experience are relevant 
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to assessing Schroeter’s state of mind, the Concurrence 
hypothesizes that they make it less plausible, not more 
plausible, that Schroeter was aware that his conduct carried a 
substantial risk of lethal harm.15  And while granting that 
                                              
15 At oral argument, Schroeter’s counsel went even 
further, stating that “[b]ecause Corporal Schroeter was an 
experienced person with training experience, in particular, it 
can’t be alleged that he knew he wasn’t following [the safety 
protocols].  He has to have believed he was following . . . them 
or he would not have done what he did.”  Oral Arg. at 37:43–
38:06, available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral 
argument/audio/16-1417Kedrav.Schroeter.mp3.  Aside from 
being entirely circular, Schroeter’s reasoning that the more 
obvious the risk, the weaker the inference of conscious 
disregard, flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent, which 
not only treats obviousness of risk as a basis from which to 
infer actual knowledge of risk, see, e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; 
see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 237–39; Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 
n.10; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208–09, but, as discussed above, also 
instructs us, in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, to 
draw this very reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff—
not, as Schroeter urges, the other way around, see Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678; see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231, 233.  Counsel’s 
argument points up another reason qualified immunity must be 
denied in this case: The complaint alleges that Schroeter acted 
with actual awareness of the risk; Schroeter disputes that 
allegation.  What we have here portends a quintessential 
disputed issue of material fact, turning on the credibility of 
witnesses to be assessed by a jury, see Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 
F.2d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1988), and certainly not appropriate for 
resolution on a motion to dismiss, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 
234–35. 
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Schroeter acknowledged in writing the safety protocols he 
failed to follow, the Concurrence rejects the unavoidable 
inference that Schroeter therefore knew the risk of harm those 
protocols were intended to prevent and instead speculates that 
Schroeter possibly “d[id] not . . . remember[]” his training and 
did not know that “he failed to follow” the rules.  Concurrence 
at 10.  Only by drawing each inference in favor of the 
defendant can the District Court and Concurrence conclude 
that Schroeter was not “aware . . . that pulling the trigger 
carried a deadly risk,” Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363–64, or 
that it is no more than “possibl[e]” or “conceivable” that he 
knew the gun “might be loaded” when he fired it.  Concurrence 
at 9 (alteration in original).    
 
Although, at trial, Schroeter might offer evidence that 
he affirmatively believed the gun was unloaded and had some 
reasonable basis for such a belief, we may not prevent the case 
from ever reaching trial by positing other possible inferences 
and “den[ying]” the plaintiff “the inferences to which her 
complaint is entitled,” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 237.  Instead, we 
need only ask whether it is “plausible”—given the obviousness 
of the risk—to believe a trained firearms instructor with twenty 
years’ experience knows that any unchecked gun might be 
loaded and therefore cannot be fired at another person without 
substantial risk of serious harm.16  To state the question is, as a 
                                              
16 The Concurrence contends that obviousness of risk 
could not, in and of itself, be sufficient to plead actual 
knowledge, excerpting from Farmer that “obviousness of a 
risk is not conclusive.”  Concurrence at 8 (quoting Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 843 n.8).  In context, however, that excerpt proves 
precisely the opposite, for the Supreme Court there explained 
that, at the summary judgment stage—despite the indisputable 
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matter of “common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, to answer 
it: Appellant’s allegations are more than enough to “nudge[]” 
her claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”  
Twombly, 556 U.S. at 570. 
 
Third, by requiring Appellant to plead that Schroeter 
had actual knowledge of a bullet in the chamber, the District 
Court imposed a novel and heightened culpability standard on 
a plaintiff pleading deliberate indifference, elevating 
knowledge of a “substantial risk” of harm to knowledge of a 
certainty of harm, confusing the “conscious disregard” 
standard that applies where an officer can exercise “unhurried 
judgment” with the far higher standard of “intent to harm” that 
applies when an officer a state actor must act in a 
“hyperpressurized environment requiring a snap judgment,” 
Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (brackets and internal quotation 
                                              
inference of actual knowledge raised by obviousness of risk—
there may yet be a genuine issue of material fact because “a 
prison official may show that the obvious escaped him.”  
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.  The Court then proceeded to 
observe that, at trial, obviousness of risk alone could support a 
finding of liability, stating that if “circumstances suggest that 
the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to 
information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ 
about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier 
of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge 
of the risk.”  Id. at 842–43.  In short, Farmer recognizes that 
obviousness of risk alone can be sufficient to survive summary 
judgment and to establish actual knowledge at trial; a fortiori, 
it is sufficient to give rise to an inference of actual knowledge 
at the pleading stage. 
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marks omitted), and, at bottom, requiring a plaintiff to plead 
criminal (and here, homicidal) intent to overcome qualified 
immunity.17   
 
“Intent to harm,” however, far exceeds what is required 
to plead deliberate indifference.  Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74.  
In discussing deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment 
                                              
17 The District Court also suggested at one point that the 
complaint was deficient for failure to plead that Schroeter was 
“consciously aware that he had failed to follow all of the safety 
rules and proceeded anyway,” emphasizing the lack of an 
allegation that Schroeter “realize[d] in the moment” he was not 
following the rules.  Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363.  There is 
no requirement, however, that a defendant be thinking “in the 
moment” he causes injury that he is violating relevant safety 
rules.  As Appellant astutely observes, to the extent the District 
Court acknowledged the allegation that Schroeter knew the 
gun safety rules and acted in violation of them, but found fault 
in Appellant’s failure to specifically allege that Schroeter 
“kn[ew] he was acting in violation of them,” its parsing of the 
culpability analysis “seems akin to counting angels dancing on 
the head of a pin.”  Appellant’s Br. 18.  More importantly, 
however, Farmer and our case law have not required a plaintiff 
to plead and prove conscious disregard of safety rules as an 
element of a state-created danger claim, but rather “conscious 
disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm,” Vargas, 783 
F.3d at 973–74 (brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842—a standard that, 
as discussed supra at Section III.B.1, may be supported (as it 
is here) by a variety of factual allegations, including the state 
actor’s violation of applicable safety protocols before the harm 
is actually inflicted.   
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context, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a claimant 
“need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act 
believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is 
enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his 
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 842.  We too have made this distinction clear in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context, describing “deliberate 
indifference” as a “willingness to ignore a foreseeable danger 
or risk,” Morse, 132 F.3d at 910, and observing that 
conscience-shocking behavior for “unhurried” situations, 
Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973, requires “proof of something less than 
knowledge that the harm was practically certain . . . [to] occur,” 
Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 
2002).   
 
The cases in which we have applied this standard also 
illustrate that the subjective knowledge test requires 
knowledge only of the substantial risk of serious harm, not of 
the certainty of that harm.  For instance, in Kneipp, we held 
that the plaintiffs could show the defending police officers’ 
mental state of “willful disregard” based on the foreseeable risk 
that serious harm was likely to befall an unescorted woman 
whom they had left “in a visibly intoxicated state in cold 
weather”; we did not require the plaintiffs to allege that the 
police officers knew with certainty that the woman would fall 
down an embankment and suffer hypothermia.  95 F.3d at 
1208–09.  In Phillips, we held that the plaintiff adequately 
alleged deliberate indifference because the complaint had 
“allege[d] facts [showing] that the defendants . . . foresaw the 
danger of harm their actions presented,” even if the complaint 
did not allege that the defendants knew with certainty that their 
former co-worker would find and kill his ex-girlfriend, her 
sister, and her then-boyfriend.  515 F.3d at 228–29, 240–41.  
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And more recently in L.R., we denied qualified immunity to 
the teacher who released a kindergartener into the custody of a 
stranger, observing that the teacher was “aware of the risk of 
harm in releasing [the child] to a stranger, even if he was 
unaware of [the perpetrator’s] specific criminal intent.”  836 
F.3d at 246.  
 
As these cases make clear, all that is required to satisfy 
deliberate indifference is “conscious disregard of a substantial 
risk of serious harm,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (brackets 
and internal quotation marks omitted), regardless of whether 
that harm is either intended or certain to occur, see Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 852 n.11; L.R., 836 F.3d at 246; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 
241; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208–09.  That is the standard 
applicable where, as here, an official has time to make 
“unhurried judgments,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973, and 
Appellant’s factual allegations are more than sufficient to 
satisfy that standard.  See supra Section III.B.1.  What is not 
required is knowledge of certainty of harm or the intent to 
harm—the standard expressly adopted by the District Court.  
See Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363–66. 
 
Lastly, the District Court’s approach to deliberate 
indifference is inconsistent not only with the applicable 
pleading and culpability standards, but also with the purposes 
of the state-created danger doctrine.  Although the District 
Court found that Schroeter could not be held liable for 
deliberate indifference without an allegation of intent to harm, 
see Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 363–66, this approach is 
mistaken, for requiring criminal or even homicidal intent for 
liability under the state-created danger doctrine disregards the 
twin goals of compensation and deterrence underlying the 
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doctrine and, more broadly, ignores the statutory goals that 
Congress codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
The state-created danger doctrine—rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, which is 
“designed to . . . secure certain individual rights against both 
State and Federal Government,” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 332 (1986)—exists to provide plaintiffs with recompense 
when a state official, who is entrusted with particular 
responsibilities and duties with respect to a particular person or 
“class of persons,” Bright, 443 F.3d at 281 (discussing 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 201 (1989)), acts with at least “conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of serious harm,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), and 
affirmatively uses his authority “in a way that create[s] a 
danger to [a] citizen or that render[s] the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger” than had he not acted at all, Bright, 443 
F.3d at 281.  Because the state-created danger doctrine applies 
only where these particular special relationships exist, the 
victims of the state officials’ acts will always be persons who 
either expected the officials not to injure them or justifiably 
relied on the officials to protect them from threats to their 
safety.  See, e.g., L.R., 836 F.3d at 239–40, 247; Phillips, 515 
F.3d at 228–29, 242–43; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1201–05, 1209 
(citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200).  Where such officials 
in unhurried situations consciously disregard the risk of harm 
to persons relying on them for safety, even if the officials did 
not know with certainty that their actions would lead to serious 
or lethal harm, the victims—or at least their survivors—are 
entitled to recompense. 
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What’s more, remedies under § 1983, as applied to 
state-created danger cases, not only seek to “provide relief to 
victims,” but also serve the additional “purpose . . . [of] 
deter[ring] state actors from using the badge of their authority 
to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights.”  
Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)).  When officers know 
that they may be held liable under § 1983 for conscience-
shocking behavior that endangers persons relying on them, see 
Bright, 443 F.3d at 281, the threat of § 1983 state-created 
danger suits acts as a deterrent force against individual officers 
acting with “conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious 
harm,” Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This “important public purpose” 
also helps “protect[] the rights of the public at large,” 
Livingstone v. N. Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 535 (3d 
Cir. 1996), because, to the extent that municipalities may be 
held liable for their officers’ conduct, see Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and to the extent non-
municipal governmental entities are obliged to indemnify 
officers held liable under § 1983, see generally, e.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 59:10A-1, state-created danger suits encourage these 
entities to implement and provide training on policies that deter 
such conscience-shocking conduct, cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 
694–95. 
 
In sum, because the allegations in Appellant’s 
complaint collectively give rise to the inference that Schroeter 
acted with actual knowledge of a substantial risk of lethal 
harm—that is, knowledge that gives rise to “a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience” under the then-clearly 
established actual knowledge theory of deliberate indifference, 
Bright, 443 F.3d at 281; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38, 843 
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n.8; Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309–10 & n.13—Appellant has 
adequately pleaded her state-created danger claim.18 
 
C. Whether the Right at Issue Was Clearly 
Established  
 
Having concluded that the facts, as alleged, plead the 
elements of a substantive due process violation under a clearly 
established theory of liability, we must still contend with 
Schroeter’s argument that there was no precedent sufficiently 
“factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations[] to put [him] on 
notice that his . . . conduct [was] constitutionally prohibited.”  
Appellee’s Br. 26 (quoting Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child 
Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016)).  This 
targets the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis 
from a different angle and requires us to ask “the objective 
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed [Schroeter’s conduct] to be lawful, in light 
of clearly established law and the information [he] possessed.”  
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; see also Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 
142 n.15. 
                                              
18 Contrary to our concurring colleague’s concerns 
about what our holding in this case portends for state-created 
danger cases or the element of deliberate indifference going 
forward, we do not today “reduc[e] the standard of deliberate 
indifference” anywhere “close to negligence.”  Concurrence at 
10.  Instead, we require of Appellant’s complaint what we have 
historically required for liability under the state-created danger 
doctrine: allegations of conscience-shocking, affirmative 
behavior from a state official that caused “foreseeable and 
fairly direct” harm to a person who was a foreseeable victim of 
that behavior.  Bright, 443 F.3d at 281.   
 40 
Because the District Court here concluded Appellant’s 
theory of deliberate indifference was not clearly established 
law, it did not proceed to define the specific right at issue or to 
address whether that right was itself clearly established at the 
relevant time.  See Kedra, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 365.  However, 
“[d]efining the right at issue is critical to this inquiry.”  L.R., 
836 F.3d at 248.  We must frame the right at issue “in light of 
the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition,” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per 
curiam), and so while “[i]ndividuals indeed have a broad 
substantive due process right to be free from ‘unjustified 
intrusions on personal security,’” L.R., 836 F.3d at 248–49, that 
defines the right at issue at too high a level of generality.   
 
Here, in view of the allegations of the complaint, we 
define what is at issue as an individual’s right not to be 
subjected, defenseless, to a police officer’s demonstration of 
the use of deadly force in a manner contrary to all applicable 
safety protocols.19  We then must determine whether the 
                                              
19 Our concurring colleague would define the right at 
issue as “a police officer’s right not to be subjected to a 
firearms training in which the instructor acts with deliberate 
indifference, that is, consciously disregards a known risk of 
death or great bodily harm.”  Concurrence at 12–13.  But that 
definition is broader, not narrower, than what we articulate 
because it is susceptible to a wide range of applications and is 
not, by its terms, anchored in any factual scenario.  Moreover, 
with that definition, it is a foregone conclusion whether the 
right is “clearly established,” because its definition merely 
repeats the elements of the claim.  Both to “give[] government 
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments,” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 
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contours of that right are sufficiently clear that “a reasonable 
officer would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.”  Rivas, 365 F.3d at 200.  We typically look to Supreme 
Court precedent or a consensus in the Courts of Appeals to give 
an officer fair warning that his conduct would be 
unconstitutional.  Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169.  However, it 
need not be the case that the exact conduct has previously been 
held unlawful so long as the “contours of the right” are 
                                              
(2012), and to avoid turning the test for clearly established 
rights into a mere tautology, see, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 204 (2001) (rejecting a suggestion to make “excessive 
force analysis indistinguishable from qualified immunity, 
rendering the separate immunity inquiry superfluous and 
inappropriate,” and holding that the two “inquiries . . . remain 
distinct”), the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished 
courts to define the right “not as a broad general proposition,” 
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 30, but in terms “‘particularized’ to the 
facts of the case,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) 
(per curiam).  That definition also conflates the first and second 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis, for while a plaintiff 
assuredly must establish the elements of a constitutional 
violation at the first prong, we do not require those elements to 
be restated within the definition of a right at the second prong 
to assess whether that right was clearly established.  Rather, the 
focus of that assessment is whether the specific conduct at 
issue is sufficiently “factually similar” to then-existing 
precedent to put a reasonable officer “on notice that 
his . . . conduct [was] constitutionally prohibited,” Mammaro, 
814 F.3d at 169, and the right at the second prong is therefore 
generally defined by the factual context of the “particular 
conduct,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, not by the legal elements 
of the claim, Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308.   
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sufficiently clear, Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, such that a 
“general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional 
law” applies with “obvious clarity,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  “If 
the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct would have been 
apparent to a reasonable official based on the current state of 
the law, it is not necessary that there be binding precedent from 
this circuit so advising.”  Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 
205, 211 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[O]fficials can still be on notice 
that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 
circumstances,” because the relevant question is whether the 
state of the law at the time of the events gave the officer “fair 
warning.”  Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  
 
We are persuaded that Schroeter had such fair warning 
at the time of the shooting.  This was not merely an accidental 
discharge of a firearm that happened to be “point[ed] . . . at 
another officer” at the time.  Concurrence at 1.  Instead, at a 
training Kedra was required to attend, he was subjected to his 
training instructor contravening each and every firearm safety 
protocol by skipping over both required safety checks, treating 
the firearm as if it were unloaded, pointing the firearm directly 
at Kedra, and pulling the trigger. 
   
Our case law made it clear at that time that state actors 
may be liable for affirmatively exposing a plaintiff to a deadly 
risk of harm through “highly dangerous . . . conduct,” Morse, 
132 F.3d at 910 n.10, or through “us[ing] their authority as 
police officers to create a dangerous situation or to make [the 
victim] more vulnerable to danger had they not intervened,” 
Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209, and that officials are expected to use 
the benefit of their expertise and professional training when 
confronted with situations in which they are responsible for 
preventing harm to other individuals, see Rivas, 365 F.3d at 
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194–95.  Under that case law, no reasonable officer who was 
aware of the lethal risk involved in demonstrating the use of 
deadly force on another person and who proceeded to conduct 
the demonstration in a manner directly contrary to known 
safety protocols could think his conduct was lawful.  On the 
contrary, as we observed in Beers-Capitol, “a reasonable [state 
actor] could not believe that h[is] actions comported with 
clearly established law while also believing that there is an 
excessive risk to the plaintiff[] and failing to adequately 
respond to that risk.”  256 F.3d at 142 n.15. 
 
In addition to our own case law and that of the Supreme 
Court, “we routinely consider decisions by other Courts of 
Appeals as part of our ‘clearly established’ analysis when we 
have not yet addressed the specific right asserted by the 
plaintiff.”  Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192–93 (3d Cir. 
2006) (collecting cases).  A closely analogous case from the 
First Circuit confirms that a reasonable officer would 
anticipate liability for this conduct.  In Marrero-Rodríguez v. 
Municipality of San Juan, that court considered the actions of 
a police lieutenant who violated numerous safety protocols 
while engaging in a training session.  677 F.3d 497, 500 (1st 
Cir. 2012).  In participating in the live demonstration exercise 
there, the officer failed to discharge the bullets from his gun 
into a sandbox as required when entering the training area, used 
a real gun rather than the required “dummy” gun, and shot the 
gun directly into the back of a trainee—who was not wearing 
a bulletproof vest—while the trainee was lying face-down on 
the ground.  Id.  Just as here, there was no allegation that the 
officer knew his gun was loaded or that he intended to harm 
his fellow officer.  The court nonetheless concluded that “using 
what was obviously lethal force, entirely disproportionate to 
any reasonable need, in conducting the lesson” was 
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“shockingly indifferent to the rights” of the trainee.20  Id. at 
501–02; cf. Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 
2003) (holding that “an official’s threat to employ deadly 
force” with a firearm rose to the level of “arbitrary and 
conscience shocking behavior prohibited by substantive due 
process”); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 167–68 
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding it was clearly established that the use 
of “deadly force, in conscious disregard of substantial risk of 
harm to innocent parties” was a constitutional due process 
violation).21   
                                              
20 The Concurrence seeks to distinguish Marrero-
Rodríguez from this case on the ground that there “dummy 
guns” were to be used, 677 F.3d at 500, whereas here the 
training involved real firearms.  For purposes of deliberate 
indifference, however, this is a distinction without a difference.  
In both cases, the officer used a firearm in a way that was not 
allowed by failing to conduct basic safety checks to determine 
whether the firearm was loaded prior to firing it.  That 
Schroeter made a “mistake, however reckless,” Concurrence at 
16, is exactly the point: “[R]eckless[] disregard[]” of a 
“substantial risk of serious harm” is the very definition of 
deliberate indifference.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. 
21 As Appellant points out, Fourth Amendment 
excessive force cases like Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340 
(7th Cir. 2009), and Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 
2006), which recognize a citizen’s clearly established right not 
to have a police officer “point” a gun at him if he poses “no 
hint of danger,” Baird, 576 F.3d at 346–47; accord Couden, 
446 F.3d at 497–98, also support the notion that the substantive 
due process right here was clearly established.  While we need 
not rely on those cases given the ample case law supporting the 
clearly established nature of this right in the substantive due 
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Schroeter, however, relies on Spady v. Bethlehem Area 
School District to argue that the right here should be defined 
more narrowly and that this right was not clearly established at 
the time.  800 F.3d 633 (3d Cir. 2015).  In Spady, a student was 
briefly submerged in water during a swimming class, exited the 
pool and complained of some chest pain, returned to the pool 
as directed for the remainder of the class, and more than an 
hour later suffered serious distress and death from a rare 
condition known as “dry drowning.”  Id. at 635–36.  In the face 
of this extremely unusual and “non-apparent condition,” we 
defined the right there as “the right to affirmative intervention 
by the state actor to minimize the risk of secondary or dry 
drowning,” and held that risk would not have been apparent to 
a reasonable gym teacher under our state-created danger cases.  
Id. at 638–42.  Drawing on that analysis, Schroeter contends 
that the harm that came to Kedra was also due to a “non-
apparent” condition, id. at 639, such that the right should be 
defined as a “right . . . in favor of a trainee in a state office 
which . . . requires affirmative compliance with all required 
safety procedures so as to . . . ‘minimize the risk’ to the trainees 
during a training session.”  Oral Arg. at 25:45–27:38 (quoting 
Spady, 800 F.3d at 638). 
 
This argument mischaracterizes the risk of harm 
presented on the face of Appellant’s complaint and misstates 
our case law.  There is nothing “non-apparent,” Spady, 800 
F.3d at 639, in the risk of harm caused by pointing a firearm at 
an unarmed person and pulling the trigger at close range.  Quite 
the opposite: The substantial risk of lethal harm is glaringly 
                                              
process context itself, those Fourth Amendment cases only 
reinforce our conclusion here. 
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obvious here and bears no resemblance to the obscure and 
improbable risk of dry drowning, which we concluded the 
coach in Spady could not have been reasonably expected to 
know about or protect against.  Indeed, we expressly 
distinguished the facts of Spady from those of Kneipp, pointing 
out that in Kneipp, the officers’ “act of separating a visibly 
intoxicated person from her traveling companion and then 
forcing her to walk home alone . . . necessarily increased the 
obvious risk that she would fall and injure herself.”  Spady, 800 
F.3d at 639.  And at issue here is not a training instructor’s 
failure to “compl[y] with all required safety procedures” to 
minimize the risk to trainees, Oral Arg. at 26:00–26:06; it is a 
training instructor’s physical demonstration of the use of 
deadly force on a defenseless subject while failing to comply 
with any required safety procedure to avoid the risk of death.  
Spady is simply inapposite where, as here, the risk was 
obvious, the risk was actually known to the state actor, the 
safety precautions that could have avoided that risk were the 
very subject matter of the actor’s training and expertise, and 
those safety precautions were skipped or directly contravened.  
 
In sum, the right alleged to have been violated was 
clearly established, and Appellant’s complaint sufficiently 
pleads a violation of that right.  Accordingly, Schroeter was not 
entitled to qualified immunity.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
1 
 
JOAN KEDRA, in her own right and as personal 
representative of the estate of David Kedra, Appellant v. 
RICHARD SCHROETER 
No. 16-1417 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
It is undeniable that this tragic death never should have 
occurred and it is indisputable that defendant Schroeter 
should have known better than to point a gun at another 
officer without following proper safety precautions. So at first 
glance, it is difficult to find fault with the majority’s 
compelling discussion of why Schroeter’s conduct shocks the 
conscience. Nonetheless, I file this concurrence to explain my 
belief that the District Court’s judgment should be reversed 
on narrower grounds than those on which the majority relies. 
I. 
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2093 (2012). It involves a two-step process, which a 
court may address in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The first step “asks whether the facts, 
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 
injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” 
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (per curiam) 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The 
second step “asks whether the right in question was clearly 
established at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
  
2 
The District Court granted Schroeter qualified 
immunity under the second prong, concluding that it was not 
clearly established that he could violate a constitutional right 
without actual knowledge that his actions posed a substantial 
risk of harm. The majority reverses, concluding that (1) Kedra 
has pleaded that Schroeter acted with actual knowledge that 
his actions posed a substantial risk of harm, and (2) the right 
at issue here was clearly established. 
The Supreme Court recently noted that it “has issued a 
number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified 
immunity cases” over “the last five years.” White v. Pauly, 
137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam). It has expressed 
“reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of substantive due 
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). Mindful of 
these cautionary words, I would limit this decision to the 
narrowest possible grounds, and would reverse solely because 
of the allegation that Schroeter pleaded guilty to recklessly 
endangering another person in Pennsylvania court. I do not 
believe that the other allegations on which the majority relies 
are sufficient—separately or together—to state a claim. 
A. 
To prove a constitutional violation under the state 
created danger theory, a plaintiff must establish four 
elements: that “(1) the harm ultimately caused was 
foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a 
degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a 
relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such 
that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s 
acts …; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that 
  
3 
rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the 
state not acted at all.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304-05 
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In the District Court, the parties 
agreed that the element at issue is the second one: whether 
Kedra alleged that Schroeter’s conduct shocks the 
conscience.1 
The Supreme Court has explained that “negligently 
inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of 
constitutional due process,” while “conduct intended to injure 
in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the 
sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 849 (1998). “Whether the point of the conscience 
shocking is reached when injuries are produced with 
culpability falling within the middle range, following from 
something more than negligence but less than intentional 
conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is a matter 
for closer calls.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). This is precisely such a close-call case—which is 
why we should, as the Supreme Court has advised, be 
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process. 
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. 
                                              
1 The majority notes that on appeal, Schroeter appears 
to contest the fourth element by arguing that his conduct 
constituted a failure to act, rather than an “affirmative act,” as 
is required. Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 
2006). The complaint sufficiently alleges that, by not 
performing safety checks and then raising and firing the gun, 
Schroeter “created an opportunity for harm that would not 
have otherwise existed.” Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 
181, 197 (3d Cir. 2004) (combination of acts and omissions 
satisfied fourth prong of state created danger analysis). 
  
4 
I agree with the majority that here, there was no 
“hyperpressurized environment” and “unhurried judgments” 
were possible. Therefore, the level of culpability required to 
shock the conscience is deliberate indifference. Sanford, 456 
F.3d at 309. We have defined deliberate indifference as 
falling in the “middle range” identified by the Supreme 
Court—“between intent, which includes proceeding with 
knowledge that the harm is substantially certain to occur and 
negligence, which involves the mere unreasonable risk of 
harm to another.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 
F.3d 902, 910 n.10 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Since we first adopted the state created danger 
theory, we have repeatedly left open whether the appropriate 
standard for evaluating deliberate indifference in a 
substantive due process case is subjective or objective. See, 
e.g., Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 428 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309 n.13. In many cases, a 
subjective standard will be more demanding, requiring the 
plaintiff to allege specific facts that shed light on the 
defendant’s mental state, rather than more general notions of 
what should have been objectively clear. 
The majority acknowledges that the subjective 
standard applies here, because it was the standard established 
in our case law at the time of Trooper Kedra’s death. 
Nevertheless, the majority goes on to analyze case law post-
dating the conduct at issue: Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. 
Ct. 2466 (2015), and L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, 
836 F.3d 235, 246 (3d Cir. 2016), among others. Maj. Op. at 
17-19. This discussion is unnecessary to the resolution of the 
case, and I would therefore avoid it. Because the majority has 
spoken, though, I feel compelled to note my disagreement. 
The majority definitively states that we settled the 
question of whether a subjective or objective standard applies 
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when we observed that the risk of harm from the teacher’s 
alleged conduct was “‘so obvious’ as to rise to the level of 
deliberate indifference.” L.R. 836 F.3d at 246. In L.R., 
however, we did not explicitly acknowledge the existence of 
two possible standards—subjective versus objective—or 
discuss the differences between them. See id. We did not 
indicate that we were adopting the objective standard or 
provide any reason for doing so, which would be a surprising 
way of ruling definitively on an issue that has split our sister 
Circuits. Moreover, the L.R. plaintiff made allegations that 
would be sufficient under the subjective standard: the teacher 
asked the stranger for identification, illustrating that he was 
“indeed aware of the risk of harm” in releasing the child to a 
stranger. Id. Therefore, L.R.’s less-than-clear allusion to the 
objective standard was dicta that was unnecessary to our 
resolution of the appeal. 
The majority’s other cases are no more persuasive. In 
Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that an objective standard 
applied to a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights. 135 S. Ct. at 
2472. But Kingsley involved an excessive force claim by a 
pretrial detainee. 135 S. Ct. at 2470. Although Kingsley and 
this case both involve Fourteenth Amendment claims, I do 
not see that prisoner cases, which implicate a host of 
specialized policy concerns, have much bearing on state 
created danger cases. The Supreme Court’s reasons for 
adopting the objective standard included prior case law 
analyzing pretrial detainee excessive force claims; the 
objective standard’s congruence with prison guards’ training; 
and the fact that the objective standard incorporates 
“deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order 
and institutional security.” Id. at 2473-75. None of those 
reasons apply here. Pretrial detainee cases from our sister 
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Circuits are similarly unpersuasive. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 
849 F.3d 17, 33 (2d Cir. 2017); Castro v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016). Prisoner claims 
under the Eighth Amendment are even further afield. See 
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017). 
The subjective standard is the appropriate test for 
deliberate indifference in a substantive due process case 
because the Fourteenth Amendment is not a “font of tort law 
to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be 
administered by the States.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 332 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
subjective standard better aligns with the purposes and limits 
of § 1983. Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 428 n.5 (an “objective 
standard” would “move the concept of deliberate indifference 
… closer to the pole of negligence”). 
Regardless of my disagreement with the majority’s 
reading of cases it acknowledges are unnecessary to its 
decision here, I agree with the majority that the qualified 
immunity determination turns on whether Kedra has pleaded 
facts from which we can infer that Schroeter acted with actual 
knowledge or “a ‘conscious disregard of a substantial risk of 
serious harm.’” L.R., 836 F.3d at 246 (quoting Vargas v. City 
of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 973–74 (3d Cir. 2015)). And while I 
appreciate that the lines between intentional conduct, 
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and conscious 
disregard may be difficult to pinpoint, in a case like this they 
are critical. Because negligence is not enough to shock the 
conscience but instead denotes “culpable carelessness,” 
Negligence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), Kedra 
must allege that Schroeter acted with more than culpable 
carelessness to have violated the Constitution. 
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Kedra satisfies this burden due to her allegation that 
Schroeter pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania court to reckless 
endangerment of another person. As the majority notes, by 
doing so, Schroeter agreed that he “recklessly engage[d] in 
conduct which place[d] … another person in danger of death 
or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705. Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[t]he mens rea for recklessly endangering 
another person is a conscious disregard of a known risk of 
death or great bodily harm to another person.” 
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 916 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Commonwealth v. Rich, 167 A.3d 157, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017) (statutory definition provides that “[a] person acts 
recklessly … when he consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk ….”) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 302(b)(3)). 
That language closely tracks with what is required for 
conscience-shocking behavior: “a ‘conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.’” L.R., 836 F.3d at 246 
(quoting Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973-74). Therefore, I agree with 
the majority that Kedra’s allegation that Schroeter pleaded 
guilty to reckless endangerment sufficiently alleges that he 
acted in a way that shocks the conscience. I also agree that the 
District Court missed the mark when it concluded that the 
guilty plea allegation is relevant “only if non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel is extended here.” Kedra v. 
Schroeter, 161 F. Supp. 3d 359, 362 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2016). This 
case is at the pleading stage, so all that is required is that the 
guilty plea “nudge[]” Kedra’s allegation that Schroeter’s 
behavior shocks the conscience “across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Because the guilty plea does just that, 
the complaint adequately alleges what is needed for the first 
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prong of the qualified immunity analysis—namely, that 
Schroeter’s “conduct violated a federal right,” Tolan, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1865, and “shocks the conscience,” Sanford, 456 F.3d 
at 304. In contrast to the majority’s treatment of the guilty 
plea as one more allegation that saves the complaint, I believe 
this is where our analysis should end. 
B. 
Aside from the guilty plea, the majority also relies on 
what it calls circumstantial evidence of conscience-shocking 
behavior: (1) the obviousness of the risk of pointing a gun at 
another person, (2) Schroeter’s professional training, and 
(3) Schroeter’s violation of safety protocols. I diverge from 
the majority in my belief that none of those factors adequately 
allege conduct that shocks the conscience. 
The “obviousness of a risk is not conclusive” as to a 
defendant’s subjective awareness of that risk. Farmer v. 
  
9 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994).2 So while we “may 
infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the 
fact that the risk is obvious,” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
738 (2002), the obviousness of a risk could also, in an 
appropriate case, support an inference that there was not 
deliberate indifference. If Schroeter knew he failed to follow 
the safety procedures, he would have had to know that his 
gun might be loaded when he pointed it at Kedra. In other 
words, in order for the obviousness of the risk to support an 
inference of deliberate indifference, we would have to infer 
that Schroeter deliberately chose not to do what was 
necessary to determine whether the gun was loaded. That may 
be “possibl[e]” or “conceivable” (for instance, if Schroeter 
had a mental illness). But in the absence of the guilty plea—
through which Schroeter admitted conscious disregard of a 
known risk—I would not find it “plausible,” as the pleading 
standard requires. Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 679-80. 
                                              
2 The majority offers an interpretation under which 
Farmer, as applied at the pleading stage, means the opposite 
of what it says—namely, that the obviousness of a risk is, in 
fact, conclusive. Maj. Op. at 32-33 n.16. However, that 
interpretation is built on the premise that Farmer holds that 
the obviousness of risk alone could support liability. Id. That 
is incorrect. Farmer posits that liability could be premised on 
what might be called obviousness-plus: evidence that a 
“substantial” risk was “longstanding, pervasive, well-
documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the 
past.” 511 U.S. at 842 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Therefore, Farmer does not say or signify that 
obviousness of a risk alone is sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss. In any event, my analysis of Farmer is simpler than 
the majority’s; I take it to mean what it says. 
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Likewise, I do not believe that Schroeter’s professional 
training and violation of safety protocols would adequately 
allege conscience-shocking behavior in the absence of the 
guilty plea. To begin with, those allegations have a temporal 
problem: under a subjective standard, the relevant inquiry is 
Schroeter’s state of mind at the time he acted. The fact that he 
received training beforehand does not mean he remembered 
it, let alone that he was aware in the moment that he failed to 
follow it. Second, a failure to follow police protocol is not 
itself sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 855 (“Regardless whether [the officer’s] behavior 
offended the … balance struck in law enforcement’s own 
codes of sound practice, it does not shock the conscience 
….”); City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 
1777 (2015) (“Even if an officer acts contrary to her training 
… that does not itself negate qualified immunity where it 
would otherwise be warranted.”). 
Most importantly, the majority’s ruling could be read, 
in the future, to significantly expand the circumstances in 
which a plaintiff can defeat a claim of qualified immunity. 
Every public official receives employment-related rules and 
trainings, but acknowledging those rules does not itself 
indicate conscious awareness of the risk of harm on a future 
occasion. Nor does violating an established rule transform 
negligence into conscience-shocking behavior. However, in 
seeming to accord equal weight to Schroeter’s prior training 
and his guilty plea, I fear the majority continues a trend of 
reducing the standard of deliberate indifference too close to 
negligence while also transforming qualified immunity “from 
a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading.” Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). And in transforming 
qualified immunity into a rule of pleading, our approach risks 
“destroy[ing] the balance that our cases strike between the 
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interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in 
public officials’ effective performance of their duties.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
In short, after scrutinizing the entire complaint, I 
conclude that aside from Schroeter’s guilty plea to reckless 
endangerment, the remaining allegations in Kedra’s 
complaint make out only a strong case of negligence. I do not 
believe they would be sufficient, by themselves, to state a 
claim that Schroeter acted with the deliberate indifference 
required to shock the conscience. 
C. 
To summarize, Kedra adequately pleaded deliberate 
indifference, and therefore she alleged all four required 
elements of a state created danger claim. Sanford, 456 F.3d at 
304-05. Having adequately pleaded her constitutional claim, 
Kedra has met the first requirement of the qualified immunity 
analysis: conduct by an officer that violates a federal right. 
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865 (2014). I arrive, then, at the second 
element that must be shown in order to defeat Schroeter’s 
claim of qualified immunity: that “the right in question was 
clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866. I 
agree with the majority’s conclusion that the right at issue in 
this case was clearly established—but again, based on 
different reasoning. 
To be clearly established under qualified immunity’s 
second prong, “a right must be sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have understood that what he is 
doing violates that right.” Reichle, 132 U.S. at 2093 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). “This is not to say 
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has previously been held 
unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law 
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the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 
640 (internal citation omitted). “[A] case directly on point” is 
not required, “but existing precedent must have placed the … 
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 
(“we [have] expressly rejected a requirement that previous 
cases be fundamentally similar” or “materially similar”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
touchstone is reasonableness: “[q]ualified immunity gives 
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 
mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When 
properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.” al-Kidd, 536 U.S. at 
743 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
As the Supreme Court has explained, “the operation of 
this standard”—that is, whether a right is clearly 
established—“depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant legal rule is to be identified.” 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Therefore, the Court has repeatedly instructed us “not to 
define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” 
that “[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative nature 
of particular conduct is clearly established,” and that our 
inquiry into the clearly established prong “must be 
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 
broad general proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 
308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The majority defines the right at issue here as “an 
individual’s right not to be subjected, defenseless, to a police 
officer’s demonstration of the use of deadly force in a manner 
contrary to all applicable safety protocols.” Maj. Op. at 40. I 
would define the right more narrowly, and in accordance with 
my analysis of the first qualified immunity prong in Section 
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I.A., as: a police officer’s right not to be subjected to a 
firearms training in which the instructor acts with deliberate 
indifference, that is, consciously disregards a known risk of 
death or great bodily harm. Schroeter’s admitted deliberate 
indifference is crucial, in my opinion, to the conclusion at the 
first step of the analysis that a right was violated. See supra 
Section I.A., B. Therefore, in order to narrowly define the 
right in light of the particular conduct at issue, Mullenix, 136 
S. Ct. at 308, I would include deliberate indifference in the 
definition. 
The majority disagrees with this definition of the right, 
saying that it conflates the first and second elements of the 
qualified immunity analysis. Maj. Op. at 40-41 n.19. I am not 
the first, however, to include a state of mind in the definition 
of a right. See Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 
167-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding it was clearly established that 
the use of “deadly force, in conscious disregard of substantial 
risk of harm to innocent parties,” was a constitutional due 
process violation). Nor is it troublesome, as a general 
proposition, that one element of a legal test overlaps with 
another element of the same or a related test. Indeed, the first 
requirement for defeating qualified immunity is redundant 
with the four prongs of a state created danger claim, and there 
is no shortage of other examples.3  
                                              
3 See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 83 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have recognized that the subjective 
deliberate indifference inquiry may overlap with the objective 
serious medical need determination ….”); Gen. Tel. Co. of 
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982) (“The 
commonality and typicality requirements of [Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure] 23(a) tend to merge,” and both “also tend to 
merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement ….”). 
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Given the unique facts of this case—namely, 
Schroeter’s guilty plea—I believe it is appropriate to tether 
the right in question to the standard of care he admitted he 
breached. The majority’s approach, by contrast, suffers from 
its focus on the violation of “all applicable safety protocols,” 
which will inevitably lead to disputes over how many safety 
protocols need to be violated for qualified immunity to be 
forfeited. And those disputes, I predict, will devolve into a 
negligence-type analysis, which precedent clearly forbids. 
The majority’s definition of the right could prove fertile 
ground for future plaintiffs seeking to lower the bar yet 
further in § 1983 cases. 
Turning to whether the right as I define it was clearly 
established, I conclude that in light of existing case law, a 
reasonable person could not have believed that it was 
consistent with Kedra’s substantive due process rights to 
subject him to a firearms training at which the instructor was 
deliberately indifferent to his safety. Therefore, the right was 
clearly established. 
Unlike the majority, I do not read existing cases as 
being “fundamentally” or “materially” similar to this one. See 
Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The lack of on-point precedent gives 
me pause, because a case’s “present[ation] [of] a unique set of 
facts and circumstances” can be “an important indication” 
that the conduct at issue “did not violate a clearly established 
right.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nonetheless, I feel constrained to conclude that 
Supreme Court and Circuit precedents have “clearly 
established” the “violative nature,” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 
308, of conducting a firearms training with deliberate 
indifference to a known risk. 
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To begin with, the deliberate indifference standard was 
clearly enunciated in the state created danger context more 
than a decade ago and was clear at the time of Kedra’s death 
in 2014. Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309 (ruling that “where 
deliberation is possible and officials have the time to make 
unhurried judgments, deliberate indifference is sufficient” to 
shock the conscience); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 241 (3d Cir. 2008). While our state created 
danger cases are not factually similar to this one—they do not 
involve police officers conducting firearms training—I cannot 
see how any reasonable official could believe that acting with 
deliberate indifference in the police firearms training context 
would be consistent with trainees’ constitutional rights. A 
reasonable officer could not be heard to say that although he 
knew that 911 employees cannot release information from 
their database in a deliberately indifferent manner, id. at 243, 
he nevertheless thought it would comport with trainees’ 
substantive due process rights to conduct a firearms training 
with deliberate indifference. 
We have reasoned, in the past, that deliberate 
indifference is simply inconsistent with objectively 
reasonable conduct. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) (reasonable defendant “could not 
believe that her actions comported with clearly established 
law while also believing that there is an excessive risk to the 
plaintiffs and failing to adequately respond to that risk[;] 
[c]onduct that is deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk 
… cannot be objectively reasonable conduct”); Carter v. City 
of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If Carter 
succeeds in establishing that the … defendants acted with 
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights—as Carter 
must in order to recover under section 1983—then a fortiori 
their conduct was not objectively reasonable.”). 
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The majority emphasizes the importance of Marrero-
Rodriguez v. San Juan, 677 F.3d 497 (1st Cir. 2012), to its 
conclusion that the right at issue here was clearly established. 
Maj. Op. at 43-44. Marrero-Rodriguez involves a police 
trainer’s deliberate indifference toward a trainee, 677 F.3d at 
502, but the case has important distinctions as well. There, 
“dummy guns” were supposed to be used, id. at 500, while 
here, Schroeter needed to use an actual gun in order to train 
the other officers on its features. Also in Marrero-Rodriguez, 
what the instructor was supposedly “training” the other 
officers to do would have itself amounted to a gross violation 
of the rights of criminal suspects. Id. at 502. There are no 
such allegations here. 
The majority dismisses the materially differing facts in 
Marrero-Rodriguez as a distinction without a difference. But 
the fact that the instructor there brought a real gun to a 
training meant to involve dummy weapons injected a level of 
danger into the training that never would have existed absent 
that deliberate act. Here, the training required a live weapon, 
so the inherent risk was of a different order than the risk 
involved in the Marrero-Rodriguez training. Kedra does not 
allege that Schroeter’s conduct was anything other than a 
mistake, however reckless. The same cannot be said for the 
instructor in Marrero-Rodriguez, and that should make a 
difference. 
Regardless, as I explain above, the Supreme Court’s 
and our court’s precedents clearly establish the right in 
question, even in the absence of directly on-point precedent. 
It is therefore immaterial whether Marrero-Rodriguez may 
have also put Schroeter on notice that his conduct was 
violative of that right. 
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II. 
I am concerned by the impact that the breadth of the 
majority’s decision could have on the law of qualified 
immunity. I am equally troubled by the recent trajectory of 
this Court’s jurisprudence. In my mind, we have gradually 
expanded substantive due process protections to cases where 
they should not apply by tortifying the Constitution and 
chipping away at the standards necessary to show deliberate 
indifference.  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o State shall … deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. Shortly after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause and stated that the Clause 
was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary 
exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the 
established principles of private right and distributive 
justice.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) 
(quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 
244 (1819)). Since then, the Supreme Court has explained 
that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to prevent the government from abusing its 
power,” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted), but not to “transform every tort 
committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.” Id. 
at 202; see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (“We have 
emphasized time and again that the touchstone of due process 
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government ….”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Supreme Court has accordingly “emphasized that only the 
most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in 
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the constitutional sense.” Id. at 846 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
In assessing what behavior is egregious enough to state 
a claim under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has 
“spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power 
as that which shocks the conscience” or “violates the 
‘decencies of civilized conduct.’” Id. In so doing, it has 
recognized that the Due Process Clause is “phrased as a 
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of 
certain minimal levels of safety.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
But it has also recognized some limited exception to that rule. 
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court noted that “when the State 
takes a person into custody and holds him there against his 
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to 
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-
being.” Id. at 199-200. DeShaney also left open the question 
of whether a constitutional violation could occur absent a 
custodial relationship when it stated: “[w]hile the State may 
have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free 
world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it render him 
any more vulnerable to them.” Id. at 201. 
Relying on that dicta in DeShaney, several Circuits 
recognized a state created danger theory for establishing a 
constitutional claim under § 1983, and we joined them in 
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996). The Supreme 
Court has yet to explicitly adopt the now widely-recognized 
state created danger theory, and the Circuits have yet to 
enforce a uniform approach to its application. But consistent 
with the fact that the Due Process Clause was not meant to 
constitutionalize state tort law, our state created danger theory 
encompasses four elements that provide some insurance that 
it protects the individual only from those abuses of power that 
lie at the heart of the concept of due process. Since “liability 
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for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the 
threshold of constitutional due process,” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 
849, the requirement that the government official act with a 
degree of culpability that shocks the conscience is perhaps the 
most critical element to providing that insurance. And 
recognizing the importance of the culpability requirement, 
our cases have frequently sought to evaluate the degree of 
culpability required to prevail under our state created danger 
theory. 
Unfortunately, because the rules of substantive due 
process are not “subject to mechanical application in 
unfamiliar territory,” id. at 850, we have, like the Supreme 
Court, struggled with how to define culpability falling 
between the intentional conduct that can sustain a due process 
violation and the negligent conduct that cannot. In this regard, 
the Supreme Court has offered that recklessness or gross 
negligence may be actionable in some cases, but the only case 
the Lewis court cited as establishing liability in that middle 
range, City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 
U.S. 239 (1983), involved a pre-trial detainee who was in 
government custody and therefore restrained from acting on 
his own behalf. Because “when the State takes a person into 
custody” it renders him unable to exercise ordinary 
responsibility for his own welfare, such cases implicate a 
unique context where “the Constitution imposes upon [the 
State] a … duty to assume some responsibility for [that 
person’s] safety and general well-being.” Deshaney, 489 U.S. 
at 199-200. And consequently, Justices Scalia and Thomas 
have asserted that the Supreme Court has “expressly left open 
whether, in a context in which the individual has not been 
deprived of the ability to care for himself in the relevant 
respect, something less than intentional conduct, such as 
recklessness or gross negligence, can ever constitute a 
  
20 
deprivation under the Due Process Clause.” Lewis, 523 U.S. 
at 863 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court left this 
question open, we have recognized such liability by defining 
deliberate indifference as “appear[ing] to fall somewhere 
between intent, which includes proceeding with knowledge 
that the harm is substantially certain to occur and negligence, 
which involves the mere unreasonable risk of harm to 
another.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 n.10 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). I question the validity of this definition. 
Gross negligence and recklessness are cognizable under state 
tort law, and the Supreme Court has “rejected claims that the 
Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal 
duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by 
state tort law.” Collins, 503 U.S at 128; see also Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
In my view, it is troubling how far we have expanded 
substantive due process, a concept the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to expand. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. Originally, 
the Due Process Clause prevented only those government 
actions that violate “those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking 
peoples.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). We took a second step by 
fashioning a state created danger theory. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 
1211. We then took a third step, stating that there could be 
liability in non-custodial situations for gross negligence. See, 
e.g., Sanford, 456 F.3d at 310. The Supreme Court, however, 
is still at step one. Given that our substantive due process 
doctrine has gradually lowered the bar for bringing a state 
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created danger claim, it may be time for this full Court to 
reexamine the doctrine. 
III. 
Perhaps the full Court will revisit the qualified 
immunity framework to reexamine whether it is consistent 
with the history of the Due Process Clause. Perhaps the 
Supreme Court will clarify the governing law by weighing in 
on the state created danger theory before we expand this 
substantive due process doctrine even further. In the 
meantime, it is worth remembering: 
The people … may well prefer a system of liability 
which would place upon the State and its officials the 
responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the 
present one. They may create such a system, if they do 
not have it already, by changing the tort law of the 
State in accordance with the regular lawmaking 
process. But they should not have it thrust upon them 
by this Court’s expansion of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. I offer this concurrence in the 
hope that it might steer us toward a firmer commitment to this 
principle. 
